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Bayesian probability theory and the Dempster–Shafer (D–S) theory of belief func-
tions are two distinct calculi for modeling and reasoning with knowledge about
propositions in uncertain domains. Bayesian networks and Dempster–Shafer belief
networks both provide graphical and numerical representations of uncertainty.
While these calculi have important diﬀerences, their underlying structures have many
signiﬁcant similarities. In a recent paper [3], we argue that these two calculi have
roughly the same expressive power. We say roughly since we do not have a metric
to measure expressiveness exactly.
There are many diﬀerent semantics of D–S belief functions, including multivalued
mapping [7], random codes [19], transferable beliefs [26], probability of provability
[16], and hints [15], which are compatible with Dempsters rule of combination. How-
ever, the semantics of belief functions as upper and lower probability bounds on some
true but unknown probability function are incompatible with Dempsters rule [29].
Also, Smets [24] gives betting rates semantics for belief functions assuming that the pig-
nistic transformation is the correct transformation. Since the pignistic transformation
does not appear to be consistent with Dempsters rule,1 these betting rates semantics
may not be valid for D–S belief functions. In this paper, we are concerned with the
D–S theoryofbelief functionswithDempsters rule of combinationas theupdating rule,
and not with theories of upper and lower probabilities, nor with Smets transferable be-
lief model with the pignistic rule. One beneﬁt of studying probability functions derived
from D–S belief functions is a clearer understanding of D–S belief function semantics.
In this paper, we propose a newmethod for translating a D–S belief function model
to a Bayesian probability model. This is useful for several reasons. First, a large model
of an uncertain domainmay have some knowledge represented by belief functions, and
some represented by probability functions. To reason with the entire model, one needs
to either translate the belief functions to probability functions, or vice-versa.
Second, although there are several proposals for decision-making using belief
functions (e.g., [17,14,27,30]), the theory of belief functions lacks a coherent decision
theory to guide the choices of lotteries in which uncertainty is described by belief
functions. One solution to this situation is to translate a belief function model to
a probability model, and then use the Bayesian decision theory to make decisions.
Smets [23] has suggested this strategy be used by applying the so-called ‘‘pignistic’’
transformation method. We are concerned that the pignistic transformation method
may not be consistent with Dempsters rule of combination. One alternative is to use
the plausibility transformation (in place of the pignistic transformation) for making
decisions with belief functions.21 In Section 4, we give an example and some arguments as to why the pignistic transformation is
inconsistent with Dempsters rule of combination.
2 In some situations such as the Ellsberg paradox [10], decision making using the probability function
derived using the plausibility transformation leads to outcomes that are at variance with empirical
ﬁndings. The topic of normative or descriptive decision making with D–S belief functions is beyond the
scope of this paper.
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have an exponential number of focal elements and may be too complex to compre-
hend. One method to summarize a complex belief function is to translate it to a
probability mass function.
Fourth, given the computational complexity of Dempsters rule, it is easy to build
belief function models where the marginals of the joint belief function for variables
of interest are computationally intractable to calculate. In such cases, one can trans-
late the belief function model to a probability model and use Bayes rule to compute
the relevant marginals of the joint probability distribution.
Fifth, a transformation method that is consistent with Dempsters rule will lead to
an increased understanding of the D–S theory of belief functions by providing prob-
abilistic semantics for belief functions. For example, consider the basic probability
assignment m for a variable H whose state space is XH = {h1, . . . ,h70}:
m({h1}) = 0.3, m({h2}) = 0.01, m({h2, . . . ,h70}) = 0.69. One can ask: What does this
basic probability assignment mean in the context of, e.g., betting for or against h1
versus h2? A transformation method that is consistent with D–S theory semantics
could provide a probability function that can be construed as a ‘‘meaning’’ of the
basic probability assignment.
Sixth, the literature on belief functions is replete with examples where it is sug-
gested that belief function theory is more expressive than probability theory since
a ‘‘corresponding’’ probability model using the pignistic transformation leads to
non-intuitive results (see, e.g., [2]). In these examples, if we use the plausibility trans-
formation method to translate the belief function models, the two models—a belief
function model and the corresponding probability model using the plausibility trans-
formation—give the same qualitative results.
Seventh, a transformation method that is consistent with D–S belief function the-
ory semantics will lead to a new method for building probabilistic models. One can
use belief function semantics of distinct evidence (or no double-counting of uncertain
knowledge [21]) to build belief function models and then use the transformation
method to convert it to a probability model.
The main contributions of this paper are ﬁve theorems and three corollaries that
describe some key properties of the plausibility transformation method. These prop-
erties allow an integration of Bayesian and D–S reasoning that takes advantage of
the eﬃciency in computation and decision-making provided by Bayesian calculus
while retaining the ﬂexibility in modeling evidence that underlies D–S reasoning.
These conclusions will lead to a greater understanding of the similarities between
the two methods and allow belief function techniques to be used in probabilistic rea-
soning, and vice versa. We also discuss an example that questions the compatibility
of the pignistic transformation method with Dempsters rule of combination.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains notation
and deﬁnitions. Section 3 describes the plausibility transformation method for trans-
lating belief functions to probability functions. Section 4 contains the main results of
the paper including one example that is used to raise the issue whether the pignistic
transformation method is compatible with Dempsters rule of combination. In Sec-
tion 5, we summarize and conclude. Proofs of all theorems are found in Appendix A.
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2.1. Probability theory
We will use upper-case Roman alphabets, such as X, Y, Z, etc., to denote vari-
ables, and lower-case Roman alphabets, such as r, s, t, etc., to denote sets of vari-
ables. Associated with each variable X, is a set of mutually exclusive and
exhaustive set of possible states, which is denoted by XX. If s is a set of variables,
then its state space is given by Xs = ·{XX jX 2 s}.
A probability potential Ps for s is a function Ps :Xs ! [0,1]. We express our knowl-
edge by probability potentials, which are combined to form the joint probability dis-
tribution, which is then marginalized to the variables of interest.
In order to deﬁne combination of probability functions, we ﬁrst need a notation
for the projection of states of a set of variables to a smaller set of variables. Here
projection simply means dropping extra coordinates; if (w,x,y,z) is a state of
{W,X,Y,Z}, for example, then the projection of (w,x,y,z) to {W,X} is simply
(w,x), which is a state of {W,X}. If s and t are sets of variables, s  t, and x is a state
of t, then x#s denotes the projection of x to s.
2.1.1. Combination
Combination in a Bayesian network involves ‘‘pointwise’’ multiplication of func-
tions. Suppose Ps is a probability potential for s and Pt is a probability potential for
t. Then Ps  Pt is a probability potential for s [ t deﬁned as follows:
ðPs  P tÞðxÞ ¼ K1P sðx#sÞP tðx#tÞ ð2:1Þ
for each x 2 Xs[t, where K =
P
{Ps(x
#s)Pt(x
#t) jx 2 Xs[t} is the normalization
constant.
2.1.2. Marginalization
Let sn{X} denote the set-theoretic subtraction of the variable X from set s. Mar-
ginalization in a Bayesian network involves addition over the state space of the vari-
ables being eliminated. Suppose Ps is a probability potential for s, and suppose X 2 s.
The marginal of Ps for sn{X}, denoted by P #ðsnfXgÞs , is the probability potential for
sn{X} deﬁned as follows:
P #ðsnfXgÞs ðyÞ ¼
X
fP sðy; xÞ j x 2 XXg ð2:2Þ
for all y 2 Xsn{X}.
2.1.3. Inference
The probability potentials speciﬁed in a probability model can be used to calculate
the prior joint distribution of the variables in the model. Inference in a Bayesian net-
work involves updating the prior joint distribution with observations of actual states
of certain variables or likelihoods of occurrence of variables based on new informa-
tion. The observations and likelihoods are modeled as probability potentials. Once
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potentials is called the joint posterior distribution. Usually, one is interested in the
marginals of the joint posterior function for some variables of interest.
2.2. Dempster–Shafer theory of belief functions
Dempster–Shafer (D–S) belief networks are an alternative to probability for mod-
eling knowledge about propositions in uncertain domains graphically and numeri-
cally. At the qualitative level, a D–S belief network provides a graphical
description of the knowledge base by modeling variables and their relations. At
the numerical level, a D–S belief network assigns a D–S belief function or basic prob-
ability assignment (bpa) to subsets of the variables in the domain of each relation.
Additional knowledge entered as evidence is used to update the D–S belief network.
If Xs is the state space of a set of variables s, a function m : 2
Xs ! ½0; 1 is a bpa for
s whenever
mð;Þ ¼ 0 and
X
fmðaÞ j a 2 2Xsg ¼ 1. ð2:3Þ
A bpa can also be stated in terms of a corresponding plausibility function or a belief
function. The plausibility function Pl corresponding to a bpa m for s is deﬁned as
Pl : 2Xs ! ½0; 1 such that for all a 2 2Xs ,
PlðaÞ ¼
X
fmðbÞ j b \ a 6¼ ;g. ð2:4Þ
The belief function Bel corresponding to a bpa m for s is deﬁned as Bel : 2Xs ! ½0; 1
such that for all a 2 2Xs,
BelðaÞ ¼
X
fmðbÞ j b  ag. ð2:5Þ
The valuation network (VN) graph deﬁned by Shenoy [20] can be used to graph-
ically represent the qualitative features of a D–S belief network. An example of a val-
uation network is shown in Fig. 1. The rounded rectangles represent variables and
the hexagons represent valuations, which are functions representing knowledge
about relations between the variables. Each valuation is connected by an edge to
each variable in its domain to create a bipartite graph. Rectangles represent evi-
dence. In Fig. 1, evidence is available for variables T and V. The arcs connecting val-
uations to variables are typically undirected; however if a bpa m for a set of
variables, say h [ t, is a ‘‘conditional’’ for some, say h, given the rest t, then this is
indicated by making the edges between m and the variables in h directed. Suppose
m is a bpa for h [ t. We say m is a conditional for h given t if m#t is a vacuous
bpa, i.e., m#t(Xt) = 1. Most of the valuations in Fig. 1 are conditionals. An exception
is the bpa for {V,G}, which is not a conditional.
2.2.1. Projection and extension of subsets
Before we can deﬁne combination and marginalization for bpas, we need the con-
cepts of projection and extension of subsets of a state space.
Threat Mode (TM) Guidance (G)Emitter (E) Visibility (V)
Threat ID (T) Range (R)
ML EO RWR
T-E
T-TM-R
T-G
V-G
TM-M L TM-G-EO TM-G-RWR
Intel. Rpt.
Visib. Rpt.
Fig. 1. A Dempster–Shafer belief network for an anti-air threat identiﬁcation problem.
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projection of a to r, denoted by a#r, is the subset of Xr given by a
#r = {x#r jx 2 a}.
By extension of a subset of a state space to a subset of a larger state space, we
mean a cylinder set extension. If r and s are sets of variables, r  s, and a is a
non-empty subset of Xr, then the extension of a to s is a · Xsnr. Let a"s denote the
extension of a to s. For example, if a is a non-empty subset of X{W,X}, then
a"{W,X,Y,Z} = a · X{Y,Z}.
Calculation of the joint bpa in a D–S belief network is accomplished by combina-
tion using Dempsters rule [7]. Consider two bpas mA and mB for a and b, respec-
tively. The combination of mA and mB, denoted by mA  mB, is a bpa for a [ b
given by
ðmA  mBÞðzÞ ¼ K1
X
mAðxÞmBðyÞ j ðx"ða[bÞÞ \ ðy"ða[bÞÞ ¼ z
  ð2:6Þ
for all non-empty z  Xa[b, where K is a normalization constant given by
K ¼
X
mAðxÞmBðyÞ j ðx"ða[bÞÞ \ ðy"ða[bÞÞ 6¼ ;
 
. ð2:7Þ
Clearly, if the normalization constant is equal to zero, the combination is not de-
ﬁned, so the two bpas are said to be not combinable. If the bpas mA and mB are
based on independent bodies of evidence, then mA  mB represents the result of
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tative and associative, so the bpas representing the evidence in the network of Fig. 1,
for instance, could be combined in any order to yield the joint bpa.
2.2.2. Marginalization
Suppose m is a bpa for s, and suppose t  s. The marginal of m for t, denoted by
m#t, is the bpa for t deﬁned as follows:
m#tðaÞ ¼
X
mðbÞ j b#t ¼ a  ð2:8Þ
for each a  Xt, where b#t denotes the subset of Xt obtained by projecting each ele-
ment of b to t. Intuitively, marginalization corresponds to coarsening of knowledge.
Similar to the probabilistic case, we make inferences from a belief function model
by computing the marginal of the joint belief function for variables of interest. All
belief functions that constitute the belief function model must be independent.3. The plausibility transformation method
Our main goal in this section is to describe a new method for translating a belief
function model to a corresponding probability function model. One method of
achieving this is to translate each independent belief function in the belief function
model to a corresponding probability function. The collection of probability func-
tions then constitutes a corresponding probability model.
Suppose m is a bpa for subset s. Let Plm denote the plausibility function for s cor-
responding to bpa m. Let Pl_Pm denote the probability function that is obtained
from m using the plausibility transformation method. Pl_Pm is deﬁned as follows:
Pl PmðxÞ ¼ K1PlmðfxgÞ ð3:1Þ
for all x 2 Xs, where K =
P
{Plm({x}) jx 2 Xs} is a normalization constant. We will
refer to Pl_Pm as the plausibility probability function corresponding to bpa m.
3.1. Other transformation methods
The most commonly used transformation method is the pignistic transformation
method3 deﬁned as follows. Let BetPm denote the pignistic probability function for s
corresponding to bpa m. Then,
BetPmðxÞ ¼
X mðaÞ
jaj j a 2 2
Xs such that x 2 a
 
ð3:2Þ
for all x 2 Xs. Daniel [6] has deﬁned a host of other transformation methods.3 The name of the transformation is due to Smets [23], but the transformation has been used in the D–S
belief function literature earlier (see, e.g., [9]).
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Haspert [13] identiﬁes the signiﬁcance of the relationship between the D–S plau-
sibility function and probability functions, noting that when multiple belief functions
on the same domain are combined using Dempsters rule, the masses in the resulting
bpa migrate to the outcome for which the product of the plausibility terms is the
greatest. He presents heuristic arguments that indicate that the plausibility function
can be used to link Bayesian and D–S reasoning. Giles [11] was among the earliest to
discuss decision making with plausibility functions. Appriou [1] suggests selecting the
hypothesis with the maximum plausibility in a decision-making context.
Dempster [8] states that the upper probability bound (or plausibility) associated
with a belief function is the appropriate likelihood function that contains all sample
information. Similarly, Halpern and Fagin [12] observe that the plausibility function
calculated from a given belief function behaves similarly to a likelihood function and
can be used to update beliefs. Given a set H consisting of basic hypotheses—one of
which is true—and another set Ob consisting of basic observations, PlObðHiÞ ¼
1 BelObðHci Þ ¼ PriðObÞ=c, where c = maxj=1,. . .,mPrj(Ob), the plausibility function
representing the observations appropriately captures the evidence of the obser-
vations.
Additionally, one form of Bayes rule has an analogous rule in terms of plausibility
functions. Suppose PA,B is a prior joint probability distribution function for two
variables A and B. The marginal distribution for B, denoted by PB, can be computed
from PA,B as follows: PB(b) =
P
{PA,B(a,b) ja 2 XA} for all a 2 XA. Now suppose we
observe B = b where PB(b) > 0. Then, the posterior marginal probability function for
A, denoted by PAjb is given by
PAjbðaÞ ¼ PA;Bða; bÞ=PBðbÞ ð4:1Þ
for all a 2 XA. Now consider the same situation in belief function calculus. Suppose
mA,B and PlA,B represent a prior bpa and the corresponding plausibility function for
{A,B}. Let PlB denote the marginal plausibility function for B. Now suppose we ob-
serve B = b such that PlB({b}) > 0. This can be represented by the bpa mb for B
where mb({b}) = 1. The posterior marginal bpa for A, denoted by mAjb, is given
by (mA,B  mb)#A. Let PlAjb denote the corresponding plausibility function for A.
It can be shown [18] that PlAjb is given by
PlAjbðfagÞ ¼ PlA;Bðfða; bÞgÞ=PlBðfbgÞ ð4:2Þ
for all a 2 XB. Comparing (4.1) and (4.2) suggests that the correspondence between a
belief function and probability function is via the plausibility function. This corre-
spondence alone does not justify the plausibility transformation, because (4.2) could
be restated in terms of the Bel function. To provide further justiﬁcation for the plau-
sibility transformation, we will state the following theorem from Voorbraak [28].
Theorem 4.1. Suppose m1, . . . ,mk are k bpas. Suppose Plm1 ; . . . ; Plmk are the
associated plausibility functions, and suppose Pl Pm1 ; . . . ; Pl Pmk are the corresponding
probability functions obtained using the plausibility transformation. If m = m1     
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corresponding plausibility probability function, then Pl Pm1      Pl Pmk ¼ Pl Pm.
The statement of the theorem is depicted pictorially in Fig. 2. Voorbraaks moti-
vation in stating the result was to eﬃciently compute a Bayesian approximation of
the joint belief function. Notice that from a computational perspective, it is much
faster to compute Pl Pm1      Pl Pmk than it is to compute Pl_Pm (since the latter
involves Dempsters rule of combination and the former involves Bayes rule). We re-
gard the plausibility probability function Pl_Pm as a translation of m from D–S be-
lief function theory to probability theory, and not necessarily as an approximation.
Theorem 4.1 is signiﬁcant for several reasons. First, we often create a belief func-
tion model, compute the joint belief function, and then translate the joint belief func-
tion to a probability function for the reasons described in Section 1. If the
transformation used is the plausibility transformation, Theorem 4.1 tells us that
we can escape the computational complexity of Dempsters rule and use Bayes rule
instead to obtain the same result.
Second, it is often easy to construct belief function models where it is intractable
to compute the joint belief function using Dempsters rule. Theorem 4.1 tells us that
we can translate the belief function model to a probability model and achieve a more
tractable result in probability theory by using Bayes rule.
Third, a qualitative aspect of uncertain knowledge is idempotency. Generally,
most uncertain knowledge is non-idempotent. However, some knowledge is idempo-
tent. Examples are observations of values of variables, vacuous knowledge, etc. It is
natural to expect the idempotent knowledge be represented by idempotent represen-
tations in any calculi that are used to represent the knowledge. A corollary of The-
orem 4.1 is that Pl_Pm is idempotent with respect to Bayes rule if m is idempotent
with respect to Dempsters rule.
Corollary 4.2. If m is idempotent with respect to Dempster’s rule, i.e., m  m = m, then
Pl_Pm is idempotent with respect to Bayes rule, i.e., Pl_Pm  Pl_Pm = Pl_Pm.
Fourth, if we use the plausibility transformation for decision making purposes,
then Theorem 4.1 tells us that a two-level decision-making scheme such as the one
proposed by Smets [23] (with the pignistic transformation) is unnecessary. SinceDempster’s rule
of combination
Plausibility
transformation
Bayes rule
Plausibility
transformation
belief
function
space
probability
function
space
m1, ..., mk m1⊗ ... ⊗mk
Pl_ Pm1 , ...,Pl _ Pmk Pl_ Pm1 ⊗ ...⊗ Pl _ Pmk = Pl _ Pm1⊗...⊗ mk
Fig. 2. A pictorial depiction of the statement of Theorem 4.1.
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rule with probability functions that are translations of the belief functions, we might
as well work with the probability functions (from a computational perspective). This
does not mean we do not need the D–S theory of belief functions as the diﬀerent
semantics of this theory provides several methods for building models that are other-
wise not available in other calculi.
Fifth, one can ask: Why is the property stated in Theorem 4.1 compelling as a
generic property for a transformation method? In the following example (adapted
from Smets [24]), we demonstrate why non-compliance with this property leads to
results that are incompatible with Dempsters rule of combination, the primary
updating rule of D–S belief function theory.
Example 4.1. Consider a bpa m for a variable H with state space XH = {h1, . . . ,h70}
as follows: m({h1}) = 0.30, m({h2}) = 0.01, m({h2,h3, . . . ,h70}) = 0.69. For this bpa
m, the plausibility probability function Pl_Pm is as follows: Pl_Pm(h1) = 0.30/
49.72 	 0.0063, Pl_Pm(h2) = 0.70/49.72 	 0.0146, Pl_Pm(h3) =    = Pl_Pm(h70) =
0.69/49.72 	 0.0144, and the pignistic probability function BetPm is as follows:
BetPm(h1) = 0.30, BetPm(h2) = 0.02, BetPm(h3) =    = BetPm(h70) = 0.01. Notice
that the two probability functions are quite different. According to Pl_Pm, h2 is
2.33 times more probable than h1. According to BetPm, h1 is 15 times more probable
than h2. Clearly, the two probability models are incompatible with each other. Which
of these two models corresponds to the knowledge in bpa m? The answer depends, of
course, on the semantics of D–S belief function theory, which is intrinsically tied to
Dempsters rule of combination.
To answer this question, consider the following hypothetical scenario consisting
only of bpa m and Dempsters rule of combination. We are interested in the true state
of variable H. We start with complete ignorance. Starting from day 1, each day we
receive an independent piece of evidence that is represented by bpa m described
above. Thus, e.g., on day 2, our total belief is described by m2 = m  m which is as
follows: m2({h1}) = 0.09/0.58 	 0.15517, m2({h2}) = 0.0139/0.58 	 0.02397, and
m2({h2, . . . ,h70}) = 0.4761/0.58 	 0.82086. On day 3, our total belief for H is given
by m3, and so on. Table 1 gives the details of some of these functions.
Suppose one subscribes to Smetss decision theory based on the pignistic
transformation. On day 1, our belief for H is given by m, and as per BetPm, we are
willing to bet for h1 against h2 with odds 15:1. On day 2, our total belief for H is
given by m2 = m  m, and as per BetPm2 we are willing to bet for h1 against h2 with
odds 4.33:1. One can ask: Why did the odds for h1 against h2 diminish on day 2 from
15:1 to 4.33:1? If the evidence on day 1 supported h1 against h2, and a similar
evidence was received on day 2, the odds for h1 against h2 should have increased and
not decreased. On day 3, as per BetPm3 , we are willing to bet on h1 against h2 with
odds 	1.4:1. On day 4, as per BetPm4 , we are now willing to bet for h2 against h1 with
odds 	2.06:1, and so on. Dempsters rule of combination tells us that each
successive evidence supports h2 against h1. This is inconsistent with BetPm. Thus, we
question whether the pignistic transformation method is compatible with Dempsters
rule.
Table 1
Values of basic probability assignments in Example 4.1 (values are speciﬁed up to 5 decimal places)
BPA Focal sets
{h1} {h2} {h2, . . . ,h70}
m 0.30 0.01 0.69
m2 0.15517 0.02397 0.82086
m3 0.07297 0.03916 0.88786
m4 0.03263 0.05410 0.91326
m5 0.01425 0.06843 0.91732
m10 0.00021 0.13399 0.86580
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transformation method. On day 1, our belief for H is given by m, and as per Pl_Pm,
we are willing to bet for h2 against h1 with odds 2.33:1. On day 2, our total belief for
H is given by m2 = m  m, and as per Pl Pm2 we are willing to bet for h2 against h1
with odds 2.332:1. Notice that this result is a consequence of Theorem 4.1 since
Pl Pm  Pl Pm ¼ Pl Pm2 . On day k, as per Pl Pmk , we are willing to bet for h2 against
h1 with odds 2.33
k:1. Thus, the plausibility transformation method appears to be
consistent with Dempsters rule.
Smets [24,25] provides a justiﬁcation for the pignistic transformation by showing
that it is invariant with respect to a linear additive updating rule (in the same sense as
Theorem 4.1, but with Dempster rule replaced by the linear additive updating rule).
We do not ﬁnd this justiﬁcation convincing since the linear additive updating rule is
not central to D–S belief function theory. The main updating rule in D–S belief
function theory is Dempsters rule, and if one substitutes Dempsters rule for the
linear additive updating rule in Smetss justiﬁcation, it results in the condition stated
in Theorem 4.1, which is satisﬁed by the plausibility transformation and not by the
pignistic transformation.
This example also demonstrates why the result stated in Theorem 4.1 is
fundamental for any method that proposes to translate a D–S belief function model
to a corresponding probability model for any of the reasons given in Section 1
including decision-making.
To further demonstrate that the plausibility transformation is consistent with
Dempsters rule of combination, we consider another asymptotic property of this
transformation. In probability theory, assuming there is a unique state x that is most
probable according to a probability function P, x has the property that
limn!1P
n(x) = 1, and limn!1P
n(y) = 0 for all y 2 Xsn{x}, where Pn denotes
P      P (n times). Belief functions have a similar property, as stated in the fol-
lowing theorem.
Theorem 4.3. Consider a bpa m for s (with corresponding plausibility function Plm)
such that x 2 Xs is the most plausible state, i.e., Plm({x}) > Plm({y}), for all
y 2 Xsn{x}. Let mn denote m      m (n times), let m1 denote limn!1 mn, and let
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1. Then Plm1ðfxgÞ ¼ 1, and
Plm1ðfygÞ ¼ 0 for all y 2 Xsn{x}.
If a unique most plausible state x exists in a bpa m, a corresponding probability
function should have x as its most probable state. This property is satisﬁed for the
plausibility transformation, as stated in the following corollary.
Corollary 4.4. Consider a bpa m for s (with corresponding plausibility function Plm)
such that x 2 Xs is the most plausible state, i.e., Plm({x}) > Plm({y}), for all
y 2 Xsn{x}. Let Pl_Pm denote the plausibility probability function corresponding to
m, and let (Pl_Pm)
1 denote limn!1 (Pl_Pm)
n. Then (Pl_Pm)
1(x) = 1, and
(Pl_Pm)
1(y) = 0 for all y 2 Xsn{x}.
In Theorem 4.3 stated earlier, the belief function m was assumed to have a unique
most plausible state x. Now suppose we have a non-singleton subset of most plausi-
ble states. In probability theory, if P is such that t  Xs is a subset of most probable
states, and P1 denotes limn!1P
n, then P1(x) = P1(y) for all x,y 2 t, and P1(z) = 0
for all z 2 Xsnt. Belief functions have a similar property, as stated in the following
theorem.
Theorem 4.5. Consider a bpa m for s (with corresponding plausibility function Plm)
such that t  Xs is a subset of most plausible states, i.e., Plm({x}) = Plm({y}) for all
x,y 2 t, and Plm({x}) > Plm({z}) for all x 2 t, and z 2 Xsnt. Let m1 denote limn!1mn,
and let Plm1 be the corresponding plausibility function. Then there exists a partition
{a1, . . . ,ak} of t such that m
1(ai) = 1/k for i = 1, . . . , k, i.e., Plm1ðfxgÞ ¼ Plm1ðfygÞ ¼
1=k for all x,y 2 t, and Plm1ðfzgÞ ¼ 0 for all z 2 Xsnt.
Theorem 4.5 is a generalization of Theorem 4.3 in the sense that if jtj = 1, then
Theorem 4.5 reduces to Theorem 4.3. The following corollary generalizes the result
in Corollary 4.4 for the case of non-unique most plausible states.
Corollary 4.6. Consider a bpa m for s (with corresponding plausibility function Plm)
such that t  Xs is a subset of most plausible states, i.e., Plm({x}) = Plm({y}) for all
x,y 2 t, and Plm({x}) > Plm({z}) for all x 2 t and z 2 Xsnt. Let Pl_Pm denote the
plausibility probability function corresponding to m, and let (Pl_Pm)
1 denote
limn!1(Pl_Pm)
n. Then (Pl_Pm)
1(x) = (Pl_Pm)
1(y) = 1/jtj for all x,y 2 t, and
(Pl_Pm)
1(z) = 0 for all z 2 Xsnt.
In general, computation of marginals in a D–S belief network is accomplished
with local computation using two operations: combination and marginalization
[22]. The plausibility transformation is not invariant with respect to marginalization.
Formally, suppose m is a bpa for s, and suppose t  s. Then (Pl_Pm)#t is not always
equal to Pl Pm#t . This is graphically shown in Fig. 3.
Example 4.2. As an example of the inconsistency depicted in Fig. 3, consider the
following bpa on the domain {V,G}:
belief function
space
probability
function
space
marginalization rule for
bpa functions
marginalization rule for
probability functions
bpa m for s
Pl_Pm
bpa m↓
↓ ↓
t
 for t
(Pl_Pm) t ≠ Pl_Pm t
plausibility
transformation
plausibility
transformation
Fig. 3. Plausibility probability transformation is not invariant under marginalization.
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mV –Gðfðv1; g1Þ; ðv2; g1ÞgÞ ¼ 0:3;
mV –Gðfðv1; g1Þ; ðv1; g2Þ; ðv2; g1Þ; ðv2; g2Þ; ðv3; g1Þ; ðv3; g2ÞgÞ ¼ 0:1.
Computing the marginal of the bpa for G, then using the plausibility transformation
to calculate Pl Pm#GV –G
gives
m#fGgV –G ðfg1gÞ ¼ 0:3; Plm#GV –Gðfg1gÞ ¼ 1:0; Pl Pm#GV –Gðg1Þ ¼ 1:0=1:7 ¼ 0:588;
m#fGgV –G ðfg1; g2gÞ ¼ 0:7; Plm#GV –Gðfg2gÞ ¼ 0:7; Pl Pm#GV –Gðg2Þ ¼ 0:7=1:7 ¼ 0:412.
Alternatively, calculating plausibilities and probabilities for the conﬁgurations of
{V,G} yields:
PlmV –Gðfðv1; g1ÞgÞ ¼ 1:0; PlmV –Gðfðv2; g1ÞgÞ ¼ 0:4; PlmV –Gðfðv3; g1ÞgÞ ¼ 0:1;
PlmV –Gðfðv1; g2ÞgÞ ¼ 0:7; PlmV –Gðfðv2; g2ÞgÞ ¼ 0:1; PlmV –Gðfðv3; g2ÞgÞ ¼ 0:1;
Pl PmV –Gðv1; g1Þ ¼ 0:417; Pl PmV –Gðv2; g1Þ ¼ 0:167; Pl PmV –Gðv3; g1Þ ¼ 0:042;
Pl PmV –Gðv1; g2Þ ¼ 0:292; Pl PmV –Gðv2; g2Þ ¼ 0:042; Pl PmV –Gðv3; g2Þ ¼ 0:042.
Marginalizing this probability function to G gives
ðPl PmV –GÞ#Gðg1Þ ¼ 0:625; ðPl PmV –GÞ#Gðg2Þ ¼ 0:375.
Clearly, the probabilities using the plausibility transformation are not, in general,
the same before and after marginalization. However, there are special cases where
the plausibility transformation yields the same result before and after marginaliza-
tion. One such special case is stated in the following theorem. An example illustrat-
ing the use of this theorem is given in [4].
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r1, . . . , rk are pairwise disjoint, i.e., ri \ rj = ; for all i5 j. Let m denote m1      mk.
Then, Pl Pm#t ¼ Pl Pm#t
1
     Pl Pm#tk .
Finally, the following theorem allows us to ﬁnd the plausibility function for a
marginal bpa without having to calculate the marginal bpa.
Theorem 4.8. Suppose m is a bpa for s and t  s. Then,
Plm#tðaÞ ¼
X
a\c#t 6¼;
mðcÞ
for all a  Xt.5. Conclusions and summary
The main goal of this paper has been to propose the plausibility transformation
method for translating belief function models to probability models, and describe
some of its properties. In particular, we have demonstrated that it results in proba-
bility models that are invariant with respect to combination, and consequently re-
tains the D–S semantics of belief functions whose primary updating rule is
Dempsters rule of combination. However, the plausibility transformation is not
invariant with respect to marginalization.
There are a number of other transformationmethods proposed in the literature.One
of them is the pignistic transformationmethod. For some examples, the pignistic trans-
formationmethod results in probabilitymodels that are qualitatively diﬀerent from the
probability models produced by the plausibility transformation method. We question
whether the pignistic transformation is compatible with Dempsters rule of combina-
tion. A comparison of these two methods with several examples is described in [5].Acknowledgements
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QARU-2003 conference for valuable comments, suggestions, and discussions.Appendix A. ProofsProof of Theorem 4.1. The proof follows directly from the proof of Proposition 2 in
[28]. The proof also follows from the fact that Dempsters rule can be stated as the
product of commonality functions and the plausibility and commonality functions
have the same values for singleton subsets. h
328 B.R. Cobb, P.P. Shenoy / Internat. J. Approx. Reason. 41 (2006) 314–330Proof of Corollary 4.2. Follows immediately from the statement of Theorem
4.1. hProof of Theorem 4.3. It follows from Theorem 4.1 that ðPl PmÞn ¼ Pl Pmn . Taking
the limit as n!1 on both sides we have limn!1ðPl PmÞn ¼ limn!1Pl Pmn ,
i.e., ðPl PmÞ1 ¼ Pl Pm1 . Since (Pl_Pm)n(x) = K1(Plm({x}))n (K1 is a constant inde-
pendent of x), Pl PmnðxÞ ¼ K2PlmnðfxgÞ (K2 is a constant independent of x),
and x is the unique most plausible state, it follows that (Pl_Pm)
1(x) = 1,
(Pl_Pm)
1(y) = 0 for all y 2 Xsn{x}. Therefore, Pl Pm1ðxÞ ¼ 1, and Pl Pm1ðyÞ ¼ 0
for all y 2 Xsn{x}. Therefore Plm1ðfxgÞ ¼ 1, and Plm1ðfygÞ ¼ 0 for all y 2
Xsn{x}. hProof of Corollary 4.4. Follows immediately from Theorem 4.3 and the deﬁnition of
Pl_Pm in (3.2). hProof of Theorem 4.5. The proof of this theorem is similar to the Proof of Theorem
4.3 and is therefore omitted. hProof of Corollary 4.6. Follows immediately from Theorem 4.5 and the deﬁnition of
Pl_Pm in (3.2). h
The following proposition is a simpler version of Theorem 4.7. We will use it to
prove Theorem 4.7.
Proposition A.1. Suppose m1 and m2 are bpas for s1 and s2 where s1 = t [ r1 and s2 =
t [ r2. Suppose r1 and r2 are disjoint, i.e., r1 \ r2 = ;. Then, Pl P ðm1m2Þ#t ¼
Pl Pm#t
1
 Pl Pm#t
2
.Proof. It follows from the axioms proposed by Shenoy and Shafer [22] that
ðm1  m2Þ#t ¼ m#t1  m#t2 . The proof of this proposition now follows directly from
Proposition 4.1 by substituting m#t1 for m1 and m
#t
2 for m2. hProof of Theorem 4.7. The proof follows directly from the proof of Proposition
A.1. hProof of Theorem 4.8. The marginal bpa of m for t is deﬁned as m#tðaÞ ¼PfmðbÞ j b#t ¼ ag for all a  Xt. The plausibility function values of the marginal
bpa of m for t are deﬁned as Plm#t ðaÞ ¼
P
a\d 6¼;m
#tðdÞ for each a  Xt. This formula
can be rewritten as Plm#tðaÞ ¼
P
a\c#t 6¼;mðcÞ for each a  Xt, which proves the
theorem. h
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